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Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights
JUD CAMPBELL*
ABSTRACT
When introducing the Bill of Rights in Congress, James Madison explained
that judges would "consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians" of
those enumerated rights. This famous passage, often treated as authoritative, is
conventionally understood to endorse the judicial enforceability of enumerated
rights and deny the judicial enforceability of unenumerated rights. Enumera-
tion, in other words, is considered as both a necessary and a sufficient condition
for the judicial enforcement of rights against contrary legislation. This Essay
disputes each of these orthodox views. Instead, it argues, Madison was comment-
ing on judicial psychology and judicial politics, not judicial duty. Enumeration,
in short, would facilitate the enforcement of rights, even if judges were already
legally obliged to uphold them. Moreover this Essay argues, both Madison's
proposed bill of rights and his speech in support were deliberately noncommit-
tal about the legal significance of enumeration. Addressing an audience that
had conflicting views on that issue, he drafted and defended the Bill of Rights
to obtain support from all sides. Consequently, neither the Bill of Rights
nor Madison's advocacy reveal whether legally speaking, enumeration is a
necessary or sufficient condition for the judicial enforcement of rights against
contrary legislation.
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INTRODUCTION
In his speech introducing the Bill of Rights to Congress on June 8, 1789,
James Madison explained that one reason for enumerating constitutional rights
was that:
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for
in the constitution by the declaration of rights.'
This was a minor point in Madison's speech, which focused on how the
proposed amendments would help shape public opinion.2 But the passage has
taken on major significance in modern conceptions of judicial authority. Schol-
ars and judges routinely interpret Madison's comments, which they often treat
as authoritative, as a defense of the idea that incorporating rights into the
Constitution was both a necessary and a sufficient condition for their judicial
enforcement against contrary legislation.3
Madison, however, was defending neither the necessity nor the sufficiency of
enumeration. In fact, the Founders were engaged in ongoing debates over the
1. James Madison, Amendments to the Constitution (June 8, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 196, 207 (Charles F. Hobson et al. eds., 1979).
2. See id. at 204-05 (amendments would "have a tendency to impress some degree of respect for
[rights], to establish the public opinion in their favor, and rouse the attention of the whole community");
see also JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
334-35 (1996) ("The true benefits of a bill of rights [for Madison] were to be found in the realm of
public opinion .... ); Colleen A. Sheehan, The Measure and Elegance of Freedom: James Madison
and the Bill of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 513 (2017).
3. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does Lockean
Legal Theory Assist in Interpretation?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 19-20 (2010); Laurence Claus,
Protecting Rights from Rights: Enumeration, Disparagement, and the Ninth Amendment, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 585, 590, 609 (2004); Bradford R. Clark, Unitary Judicial Review, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
319, 347-48 (2003); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Elusive Foundation: John Marshall, James Wilson, and
the Problem of Reconciling Popular Sovereignty and Natural Law Jurisprudence in the New Federal
Republic, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 113, 175-76 (2003); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BIL OF RIGHTS
259 (1999); Raoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, As Perceived by Randy Barnett, 88 Nw. U. L. REV.
1508, 1517 (1994); David S. Bogen, The Origins of Freedom of Speech and Press, 42 MD. L. REV. 429,
458 (1983); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241-42 (1979). Akhil Amar notes the intriguing
possibility that Madison was speaking about jury decisions, too, and not just judicial review. AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE BIL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 129-30 (1998). Tracking Madison's
comments, this Essay focuses solely on the problem of judicial review-that is, the enforcement of
rights against contrary legislation. It does not dispute, however, that judges might be said to "enforce"
constitutional rules of judicial procedure (e.g., the Seventh Amendment) simply by following those
rules (e.g., by convening a civil jury) in absence of any legislative direction one way or the other.
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legal significance of enumeration, and Madison drafted and supported the Bill
of Rights in a way that stayed neutral in that controversy. For many Federalists
in Congress, the enumeration of most rights was legally inconsequential. Rights
existed prior to constitutional development; they were sometimes judicially
enforceable, sometimes not; and enumeration usually did not change their
definition or the means of their enforcement. And even Federalists who dis-
agreed with these views hardly were eager to empower judges to limit federal
power. If Madison was asserting the necessity and sufficiency of enumeration as
a legal matter, he was misreading his audience.
But Madison's point was more practical: Enumeration was important to
judging. In part, written declarations proved the existence and fundamentality of
certain rights, reducing uncertainty about the law. Enumerating rights also gave
courts lexical ammunition when confronting political actors, fostering the will-
ingness of judges to enforce those rights in the first place and helping insulate
them from political backlash afterward. In an environment where assertions of
judicial review were highly controversial, judges needed all the help they could
get to "consider themselves" a safeguard for rights.
When taking this position, Madison was employing a prevalent form of
constitutional argument. The Founders often spoke about governmental power
in terms of practical authority (as a political scientist might) rather than legal
authority (as lawyers usually do).4 After all, constitutional compliance requires
concrete human actions, not just abstract legal obligations. And the Founders
took this lesson to heart regarding judicial review. When stressing the impor-
tance of enumeration to judging, Madison was making a point about judicial
psychology and judicial politics, not judicial duty. He was speaking as a
political scientist rather than as a lawyer.
But what, then, was Madison saying about the legal necessity or sufficiency
of enumerating rights? The answer is simple: Nothing at all. Personally, Madi-
son had no dog in that fight. And he was trying to sell the Bill of Rights to an
audience with competing views. Consequently, both in drafting the Bill of
Rights and in publicly advocating for its passage, Madison stayed neutral about
the legal importance of enumerating rights. Modern interpreters must, therefore,
look elsewhere for historical guidance about the relationship between judicial
review and the enumeration of rights.
I. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY RIGHTS
Madison was a late convert to the enumeration cause. Like many Federalists,
he had agreed to amendments during the ratification debates as a way to diffuse
4. See Wesley J. Campbell, Commandeering and Constitutional Change, 122 YALE L.J. 1104,
1178 n.301 (2013). Law professors, too, occasionally think in this way. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial
Independence and the Rationing of Constitutional Remedies, 65 DuKE L.J. 1 (2015); Daryl J. Levinson,
Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REv. 657
(2011).
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the passionate and widespread opposition that had nearly defeated the Constitu-
tion.5 Even after ratification, however, Madison privately derided declarations
of rights as mere "parchment barriers,"6 and he became a leading proponent of
enumeration only under pressure from his political mentor, Thomas Jefferson,
and faced with a bruising electoral campaign in a district drawn to favor his
opponent, James Monroe. Madison's "grudging acceptance of political neces-
sity," Jack Rakove observes, "reflected no sudden realization that a national bill
of rights would have great practical value."8
But reluctant as his paternity of the Bill of Rights may have been, Madison
admirably followed through on his campaign promise to amend the Constitu-
tion, and it is worth carefully examining his arguments favoring enumeration.
To understand Madison's comments in context, however, we need to have a
better sense of his audience. The Founders, it turns out, spoke about rights and
their judicial enforceability in an initially bewildering, but ultimately comprehen-
sible, variety of ways.9
A. Natural Rights
One type of rights was natural rights, which referred to innate human ca-
pacities, like eating, moving, or speaking. "A natural right is an animal right,"
Thomas Paine succinctly explained, "and the power to act it, is supposed, either
fully or in part, to be mechanically contained within ourselves as individuals." 10
In general, though, natural rights did not impose determinate limitations on
governmental authority. Rather, because of social obligations stemming either
from natural law or from an imagined social contract, the government could
restrict natural liberty with the consent of the people or their representatives
whenever doing so served the public interest.
Consequently, the retention of natural rights, even in a written bill of rights,
usually did not give rise to firm, judicially enforceable limits on legislative
power.1 2 As Republican lawyer George Hay observed in 1799, if the Speech and
Press Clauses simply recognized a natural right of expressive freedom, the First
5. Paul Finkelman, James Madison and the Bill of Rights: A Reluctant Paternity, 1990 Sup. C. REv.
301, 322-28.
6. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL SERIES 295, 297 (Robert A. Rutland & Charles F. Hobson eds., 1977).
7. Finkelman, supra note 5, at 328-36.
8. RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 333; see also Finkelman, supra note 5, at 304-08. Many of his
colleagues thought that Madison was pursuing amendments simply for political reasons. See Kenneth
R. Bowling, "A Tub to the Whale": The Founding Fathers and Adoption of the Federal Bill of Rights, 8
J. EARLY REPUBLIC 223, 236-37 (1988).
9. Some Founders rejected judicial review entirely, but this Essay focuses on the divergence in views
among those who accepted judicial review in some form.
10. Common Sense [Thomas Paine], Candid and Critical Remarks on Letter 1, Signed Ludlow, PA.
JOURNAL AND THE WEEKLY ADVERTISER, June 4, 1777, at 1.
11. See Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85,
92-98 (2017).
12. Id. at 106-08.
[Vol. 15:569
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE ENUMERATION OF RIGHTS
Amendment would "amount precisely to the privilege of publishing, as far as
the legislative power shall say, the public good requires." 1 3 Indeed, even those
who had an expansive view of judicial power agreed that judges could not apply
their own assessments of the general welfare.1 4 Questions "of mere expediency
or policy" simply were not amenable to judicial resolution.1 5 It is entirely
unsurprising, then, that Founding Era judges never directly enforced state
constitutional provisions that affirmed the inviolability of the natural rights of
life, liberty, and property. Constitutional provisions that lacked legal content,
Alexander Hamilton aptly stated in Federalist No. 84, "amount[ed] to nothing"
as a legal matter.1 6
Nonetheless, many Founders affirmed support for a qualified judicial applica-
tion of natural-rights principles. Most straightforwardly, some jurists advocated
disregarding laws that clearly departed from the public interest. 17 The enforce-
ment of legislative acts, Virginia Judge Spencer Roane declared in 1809, was
not only bounded "by the constitutions of the general and state governments"
but "limited also by considerations of justice," at least when laws reflected a
"crying grade of injustice." 8 But others virulently contested this idea. Judges
"could declare an unconstitutional law void" when "plainly" in violation of the
Constitution, George Mason remarked at the Philadelphia Convention, but they
13. HoRTENSIUS [George Hay], AN ESSAY ON THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESs 38 (Philadelphia, Aurora 1799).
14. See Brutus No. 6 (Dec. 27, 1787), in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 110, 115 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1984).
15. Letter from James Madison to Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 1 THE PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON: RETIREMENT SERIES 500, 501 (David B. Mattern et al. eds., 2009); see, e.g., Trs. of Univ. of
N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 88 (1805) ("[T]he judiciary are only to expound and enforce the law
and have no discretionary powers enabling them to judge of the propriety or impropriety of laws.");
Madison, supra note 1, at 205 (arguing that "it is for [Congress] to judge of the necessity and propriety"
of laws); Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 10, 1788) (remarks of James Monroe), in 9
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1092, 1112 (John P Kaminski et al.
eds., 1990) (claiming that Congress would be "not restrained or controuled from making any law,
however oppressive in its operation, which they may think necessary to carry their powers into effect");
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 4, 1787) (remarks of James Wilson), in 2 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 465, 468 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976)
("The powers of Congress are unlimited and undefined. They will be the judges of what is necessary
and proper."); An Old Whig No. 2, PHILA. INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Oct. 17, 1787, reprinted in 13 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 399, 402 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
1981) ("[F]rom the nature of their power [members of Congress] must necessarily be the judges, what
laws are necessary and proper."). When participating in a council of revision, however, judges could
venture beyond these limitations to address questions of propriety. See infra note 19.
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 580 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Instead,
Hamilton continued, "whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must
altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the government."
See id.
17. See Campbell, supra note 11, at 107-08.
18. Currie's Adm'rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc'y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 346, 350 (1809) (opinion of
Roane, J.); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) ("There are
certain vital principles ... which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of
legislative power .... ); Bank of State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 603 (Special Ct, 1831)
(opinion of Green, J.) ("Some acts, although not expressly forbidden, may be against the plain and
obvious dictates of reason." (emphasis added)).
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had to give "free course" to all other laws, "however unjust oppressive or
pernicious."l9
The most common position among American legal elites fell between these
extremes. Drawing from their understanding of Edward Coke's 1610 decision in
Dr Bonham's Case,2 0 the Founders widely agreed that judges should, when
possible, construe statutes to comport with the public interest. 21 Alexander
Hamilton, for instance, took this view in his famous exposition of judicial
authority in Federalist No. 78. After explaining that judges would "declare all
acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void," 22 Hamilton noted
the importance of judicial independence for the protection of natural rights:
But it is not with a view to infractions of the [C]onstitution only, that the
independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects
of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther
than to the injury of the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by
unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of
vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such
laws.23
The quintessential abridgment of natural rights by the government, it bears
emphasis, was a deprivation of liberty, or property effected by an unjust or
partial law.
Meanwhile, a narrower class of natural rights imposed more determinate
restrictions on governmental authority. These "r[i]ghts of the mind," as Nathan-
iel Chipman put it, offered protection for the freedom of religious exercise and
19. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 78 (Max Farrand ed., Yale Univ. Press
rev. ed. 1966) (1911) (remarks of George Mason); see also, e.g., Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (opinion of
Iredell, J.) ("[T]he Court cannot pronounce [a law] to be void, merely because it is, in their judgment,
contrary to the principles of natural justice."). Though he did not accept inherent judicial authority to
enforce natural law, Mason supported a council of revision enabling federal judges to "giv[e] aid in
preventing every improper [state] law. Their aid will be the more valuable as they are in the habit and
practice of considering laws in their true principles, and in all their consequences." 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra, at 78; see also Edmund Randolph's Suggestion for Conciliating the Small
States (July 10, 1787), in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 55-56 (proposing "that any individual
conceiving himself injured or oppressed by the partiality or injustice of a law of any particular State
may resort to the National Judiciary, who may adjudge such law to be void, if found contrary to the
principles of equity and justice").
20. Dr. Bonham's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (1610); see generally R.H. Helmholz, Bonham's Case,
Judicial Review, and the Law of Nature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325 (2009); PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND
JUDICIAL DUTY 622-30 (2008).
21. See HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 339-57; LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEw 20-24 (2004).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton).
23. Id.; see, e.g., Ham v. M'Claws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93, 98 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 1789) ("We are ... bound
to give such a construction to this enacting clause . . . , as will be consistent with justice, and the
dictates of natural reason, though contrary to the strict letter of the law . . . .").
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the right to make well-intentioned statements of one's thoughts,2 limiting both
the ends and the means of governmental authority.25 But, once again, enumera-
tion did not seem to matter. Everyone had a right "of speaking and writing their
minds-a right, of which no law can divest them," Congressman John Vining
observed before the First Amendment was ratified.2 6 This right, Fisher Ames
chimed in, was "an unalienable right, which you cannot take from them, nor can
they divest themselves of," and any abridgment would therefore be "nuga-
tory." 2 7 The Founders often made similar claims about the inalienability of
24. NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 174 (Rutland, J. Lyon 1793)
(contrasting "r[i]ghts of the mind" with other natural rights); see Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the
First Amendment, YALE L.J. (forthcoming); see also, e.g., JOHN WITHERSPOON, Lectures on Moral
Philosophy: Lecture VIII, in 3 THE WORKS OF THE REV. JOHN WITHERSPOON 405, 408 (Philadelphia,
William W. Woodward 2d ed., rev. 1802) (mentioning "a right over [man's] own knowledge, thoughts,
&c" as an inalienable right). The Founders often referred to these rights as "unalienable" natural rights.
See Campbell, supra note 11, at 97 n.61. Confusingly, the Founders also used the term "unalienable" to
describe a broad class of rights-including the rights to life, liberty, and property-that simply could
not be divested to the control of a monarch. These rights, however, could be regulated in the public
interest. See id. at 97-98; see, e.g., North Carolina Ratification Convention Debates (July 24, 1788)
(remarks of David Caldwell), in 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION IN PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 3,
40 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., Washington, D.C., n. pub. 1836) ("Unalienable rights ought not to be
given up, if not necessary.").
25. A great deal of scholarly confusion about natural rights stems from the fluid and often deceptive
ways that Federalists discussed these rights throughout the ratification debates. Federalists usually
treated the surrender or preservation of natural rights in terms of the ends of governmental power. See,
e.g., The Report of the Constitutional Convention (Sept. 17, 1787), in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 199, 211 ("It is at all times difficult to draw
with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be
reserved. . . ."); Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Dec. 5, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 458, 459 ("If a line can be drawn between the powers granted and the
rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether the latter be secured by declaring that they
shall not be abridged, or that the former shall not be extended."). In other words, "parting with natural
rights" was sometimes lexically equivalent to "the surrendering of a power to controul our natural
rights." Theophilus Parsons, Essex Result (1778), in THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS
PARSONS 359, 365 (Boston, Ticknor & Fields 1861). And in this limited sense, withheld powers and
retained natural rights were flip sides of the same coin. Cf Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning
of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215, 1292 (1990). But "unsurrendered" natural liberty
could still be regulated pursuant to other valid ends of governmental authority. "The absence of an
enumerated power over the liberty of locomotion, for instance, meant that the federal government
lacked plenary authority to restrict individual movement in the public interest," but Congress could still
"restrict individual movement when pursuing [its enumerated] powers." Campbell, supra note 11, at
103. By contrast, "rights of the mind" were unique because the government lacked authority to abridge
these rights even when based on a claimed public benefit. See id. at 92, 97.
26. Congressional Debates (Jan. 21, 1791) (remarks of Rep. John Vining), in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, MARCH 4, 1789-MARCH 3,
1791, at 340 (William Charles DiGiacomantonio et al. eds., 1995).
27. Id. at 342 (remarks of Rep. Fisher Ames). Vining and Ames opposed a proposal "to prevent" tax
collectors from "interfering, either directly, or indirectly, in elections, further than giving their own
votes, on penalty of forfeiting their offices." Id. at 339 (remarks of Rep. James Jackson). Apparently
nobody in Congress asserted that the freedom of speech was unrecognized because the First Amend-
ment was not yet in effect. Moreover, with power to regulate federal employment undisputed, this
debate illustrates how inalienable rights were not the inverse of powers. Cf supra notes 24-25, infra
note 104 and accompanying text.
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religious freedom.2 8
In short, with respect to natural rights, enumeration was not a necessary or
sufficient condition for their judicial enforcement. Some Founders saw judges
as an important backstop for the defense of natural rights, even though these
"rights" generally lacked determinate legal content. Yet, as Roane's and Hamil-
ton's statements plainly reveal, this authority was derived not from the constitu-
tional enumeration of natural rights but instead from background principles of
social-contract theory and of judicial obligation. Enumeration did not, as a legal
matter, seem to affect the judicial enforceability of natural rights.
B. Positive Rights
In contrast to natural rights, positive rights were rights defined in particular
relation to governmental authority, like the right to a jury trial, the rule against
press licensing, and the ban on ex post facto laws. These rights were often
enforceable in court, and some of them-namely, fundamental positive rights-
even had the status of supreme law. Positive rights with "constitutional or
fundamental" status, Federal Farmer explained, could not "be altered or abol-
ished by the ordinary laws."29 Other positive rights, though, were "mere legal
rights" that were "such as individuals claim under laws which the ordinary
legislature may alter or abolish at pleasure." 3 0 A crucial issue, then, was
identifying which positive rights were "fundamental."
Many Founders thought that fundamental positive rights were identifiable by
looking to custom, without any need for constitutional enumeration. During the
colonial period, after all, Americans had widely accepted the existence of a
customary constitution that guaranteed a variety of individual rights. 3 1 "Like
other forms of customary law," Larry Kramer observes, "the content of this
constitution was uncertain and open-ended," but "[i]t did not follow that
nothing was fixed." 3 2 The fundamentality of some rights, like the protection of a
jury trial and the rule against ex post facto laws, was well established.33
Consequently, even once Americans began to enact written constitutions,
about half of the states did not adopt bills of rights. Enumerating natural rights
was unnecessary, many Founders thought, because the people retained full
control, through their legislative representatives, over regulations of natural
28. See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 25, at 371 ("[I]n entering into political society, [man] surrendered
this right of controul over his person and property, (with an exception to the rights of conscience) to the
supreme legislative power, to be exercised by that power, when the good of the whole demanded it.");
N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. 1, art. 4 ("Among the natural rights, some are in their very nature unalienable,
because no equivalent can be given or received for them. Of this kind are the RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE.").
29. Federal Farmer No. 6 (1787), reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 979, 983-84 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2004).
30. Id. at 984.
31. The leading study is JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 4
vols. (1986-1993). For a shorter discussion, see KRAMER, supra note 21, at 9-34.
32. KRAMER, supra note 21, at 14.
33. See Campbell, supra note 11, at 106.
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liberty. 3 4 The natural rights of life, liberty, and property were thus preserved
through republicanism. 35 And since an imagined social contract preserved both
the inalienable right of conscience and the host of fundamental positive rights
that individuals received "as a consideration for the [natural] rights ... surren-
dered," 36 it was unnecessary to enumerate these rights in a constitution. These
more determinate constraints on legislative authority were already guaranteed.
Nor did this view recede as Americans began adopting declarations of rights
in the 1770s and 1780s. Instead, bills of rights were declaratory documents,
reaffirming those positive rights already known to be fundamental, with men-
tions of some natural rights as well. 37 "The amendments reported are a declara-
tion of rights," Roger Sherman explained in the First Congress. "[T]he people
are secure in them, whether we declare them or not." 38 But that did not make
enumeration pointless. Rather, writing down rights served an educative function
and gave these rights "a degree of explicitness and clarity." 39
By the late 1780s, however, enumerating rights was not always just a
declaratory exercise. Constitutional enumeration also had come to provide an
avenue for recognizing the fundamentality of positive rights not supported by
custom. In other words, incorporating non-fundamental positive rights into a
constitution offered a way of elevating those rights to constitutional status.4 0 In
the late eighteenth century, for instance, many Americans did not perceive there
to be customary bans on bills of attainder, religious tests for holding public
office, and governmental interference with contracts.4 1 If Americans wanted to
34. See id. at 96-98; see, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 16, at 578 (Alexander Hamilton)
("[I]n strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain every thing, they have no need of
particular reservations.").
35. See Campbell, supra note 11, at 96-98.
36. Parsons, supra note 25, at 367.
37. See, e.g., John Phillip Reid, The Authority of Rights at the American Founding, in THE NATURE OF
RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 67, 97 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 2007); GORDON S. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 295 (1969); see also Michael W. McConnell,
Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 173, 197 ("Our written
Constitution presupposed an established set of fundamental rights not created by the Constitution but
protected or preserved by it.").
38. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 715 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (remarks of Rep. Roger Sherman); see
also, e.g., Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 16, 1788) (remarks of George Nicholas), in
10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1334 (John P. Kaminski et al.
eds., 1993) ("A Bill of Rights, is only an acknowledgement of the pre-existing claim to rights in the
people. They belong to us as much as if they had been inserted in the Constitution.").
39. KRAMER, supra note 21, at 51.
40. See Federal Farmer No. 6, supra note 29, at 984 (fundamental positive rights included rights "so
strengthened by long usage as not to be repealable by the ordinary legislature" and rights claimed
"under the solemn compacts of the people, as constitutions"); Federal Farmer No. 16 (1788), reprinted
in 20 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION, supra note 29, at 1051, 1057-58 (fundamental positive
rights are recognized "under compacts, or immemorial usage").
41. See, e.g., Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14, 19 (1800) (opinion of Paterson, J.) ("I consider it
as a sound political proposition, that wherever the legislative power of a government is undefined, it
includes the judicial and executive attributes."); Gerard V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and
the Constitution of Religious Liberty: A Machine That Has Gone of Itself, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 674,
2017] 577
578 THE GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 15:569
constitutionally prohibit these types of laws, therefore, they needed to enact
constitutional rules against them.
When positive rights were recognized as fundamental, whether through
custom, constitutional enumeration, or both,4 2 these rights were usually judi-
cially enforceable.4 3 Indeed, many of these rights, like the right to a jury, dealt
with issues of judicial process.4 4 And, when recognized as fundamental, they
typically operated as supreme law, superseding any contrary legislation. Should
Congress attempt to infringe the people's rights, Theophilus Parsons declared in
the Massachusetts Ratification Convention, "the act would be a nullity, and
could not be enforced." 4 5 An assortment of Founding Era judicial decisions
seem to validate that view with respect to both customary and enumerated
rights.4 6
At the same time, however, a number of Americans in the late 1780s began to
suggest that enumeration might be a necessary condition for the preservation of
fundamental positive rights. These suggestions were rarely made in particular
reference to judicial enforcement." But since so many of those rights were
681 (1987) ("[I]n 1787 . .. 'non-Christians' could not hold public office anywhere in the states, except
perhaps in Virginia."); 1 ANNALS OF CONG. (1790), supra note 38, at 1210 (remarks of Rep. Theodore
Sedgwick) (acknowledging governmental authority "to interfere with contracts, public and private"
when done to promote "the public welfare"). But see THE FEDERALIST No. 44, supra note 16, at 301
(James Madison) ("Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts,
are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation.").
42. Enumeration, after all, could remove uncertainty about the fundamentality of particular positive
rights, even if the weight of legal authority already supported that view.
43. Americans who rejected Parliamentary supremacy sometimes asserted the judicial enforceability
of customary fundamental rights even during the Colonial period. See HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at
274-78.
44. See Federal Farmer No. 16, supra note 40, at 1057 (noting a variety of "particular essential
rights the people are entitled to in [judicial] proceedings").
45. Massachusetts Ratification Convention Debates (Feb. 5, 1788) (remarks of Theophilus Parsons),
in 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1450 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds.,
2000).
46. See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127
(1987); Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 171 (1992); William Michael
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005).
47. See Federal Farmer No. 16, supra note 40, at 1057-58 ("[I]t will by no means follow, that [the
people] will be entitled to [fundamental positive rights] in the federal courts, and have a right to assert
them, unless secured and established by the constitution or federal laws," because "it is doubtful, at
least, whether [fundamental positive rights] can be claimed under immemorial usage in this country.");
George Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the Convention, in 8 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 43 ("Nor are the
People secured even in the Enjoyment of the Benefits of the common-Law; (which stands here upon no
other Foundation than it's [sic] having been adopted by the respective Acts forming the Constitutions of
the several States.)."); see also Jack N. Rakove, The Dilemma of Declaring Rights, in THE NATURE OF
RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND, supra note 37, at 181, 193 (noting the "positivist"
dimension of Anti-Federalist arguments).
48. See RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 323; cf An Old Whig No. 2, supra note 15, at 402 ("[W]ho can
overrule [Congress's] pretensions?-No one, unless we had a bill of rights to which we might appeal,
and under which we might contend against any assumption of undue power and appeal to the judicial
branch of the government to protect us by their judgements.").
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about judicial procedures, and since preserving rights was an obvious precondi-
tion for their judicial protection, the positivist dimension of these arguments
planted the seeds for the idea that rights had to be constitutionally enumerated
before they could trump contrary legislation.4 9
In short, with respect to positive rights, enumeration typically was a sufficient
condition for judicial enforcement,5 0 but whether it was also a necessary
condition was more in doubt. For rights that were not customarily recognized as
fundamental, enumeration was clearly necessary. For those rights that were part
of the customary constitution, however, many Founders denied the necessity of
enumeration, although not everyone agreed.
II. THE PHILADELPHIA CONVENTION
An episode during the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 illustrates how the
Framers applied these principles when drafting the Constitution. The story
begins with a discussion about whether to enumerate certain rights.
In the midst of debates over congressional powers, Elbridge Gerry and James
McHenry moved for a clause banning federal bills of attainder and ex post facto
laws.5 ' Gouverneur Morris "thought the precaution as to ex post facto laws
unnecessary; but essential as to bills of attainder." 5 2 Oliver Ellsworth enthusias-
tically agreed. "[T]here was no lawyer, no civilian," the Connecticut jurist
explained, "who would not say that ex post facto laws were void of themselves.
It cannot then be necessary to prohibit them." 5 3 James Wilson chimed in, too,
noting that a constitutional ban on ex post facto laws would suggest that the
Framers were "ignorant of the first principles of Legislation," or at least were
"constituting a Government which will be so." 5 4 No one, however, denied that it
was essential to enumerate a prohibition against bills of attainder, and that
proposal passed without dissent.
49. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.).
50. Two caveats are in order. First, for those Founders who denied judicial authority to determine the
constitutionality of statutes, enumeration obviously was not a sufficient condition for judicial enforce-
ment. Second, the scope of enumerated rights might still, in some cases, lack the requisite clarity for
judicial enforcement. See Calder, 3 U.S. at 399 (opinion of Iredell, J.) ("[A]s the authority to declare [a
statute] void is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but in a clear
and urgent case."); James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140-42 (1893) (discussing the clarity requirement in Founding Era judicial
review); Christopher R. Green, Clarity and Reasonable Doubt in Early State-Constitutional Judicial
Review, 57 S. TEX. L. REV. 169, 172-83 (2015) (same); John McGinnis, The Duty of Clarity, 84 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 843, 880-904 (2016) (same).
51. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 19, at 375. It is important to keep in mind
that Madison's notes from late in the Convention are particularly unreliable. See MARY SARAH BILDER,
MADISON'S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 141-47 (2015).
52. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 19, at 376.
53. Id.; see also id. ("Docr. Johnson thought the clause unnecessary, and implying an improper
suspicion of the National Legislature.").
54. Id.
55. Id. ("The first part of the motion relating to bills of attainder was agreed to nem[ine] contradi-
cente.").
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The weight of opinion among the Framers seemed to be decidedly against
enumerating a ban on ex post facto laws. So why did they add one anyway?
One possibility is the educative function that declarations of rights served in
guiding political officials and shaping public opinion-goals that undergirded
most calls for a declaration of rights during the ensuing ratification contro-
versy.56 That point is worth emphasizing: The leading reason for enumerating
rights in the late 1780s had nothing to do with courts or judges.
But at the end of the discussion, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina made an
intriguing argument relating to the legal enforcement of rights. "Such a prohibi-
tory clause is in the Constitution of N. Carolina," Williamson announced, "and
tho it has been violated, it has done good there & may do good here, because
the Judges can take hold of it."5 7 Perhaps enumeration, in other words, would
facilitate judicial review.
Indeed, a significant confrontation over the authority of judges to rule on the
constitutionality of legislation had recently unfolded in North Carolina. William-
son was a bit confused about the details. The case, Bayard v. Singleton, actually
raised the question whether a procedural bar in loyalist-property suits violated
the right to trial by jury-not the ban on ex post facto laws. 5" But Williamson's
point was still valid. The presence of an enumerated jury right in North
Carolina's declaration of rights gave the judges in Bayard something to "take
hold of' when striking down legislation.5 9
But was Williamson saying that enumeration was legally necessary? The
historical record is unclear. During the Bayard proceedings, the judges never
questioned the judicial enforceability of certain unenumerated positive rights. 0
Nor did Williamson or any of his colleagues in Philadelphia rebut Ellsworth's
56. See supra note 2 and infra notes 77-78, and accompanying text.
57. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 19, at 376.
58. See HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 458. Williamson can be forgiven for his confusion. Both the
dissenters in the North Carolina legislature and the lawyers for the plaintiff made a variety of arguments
against the law, including the position that it was an ex post facto law. See id. at 452 (describing the
lawyers' position); 17 THE STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 419 (statement of legislative dissenters)
(Walter Clark ed., Goldsboro, N.C., Nash Bros. Book & Job Printers 1899). The dissenters had also
derided the law as "a violation even of the forms of Justice" and thus was, "as an unconstitutional
law, ... nugatory." Id. at 420. Instead, they insisted, all citizens must enjoy "the known and established
rules of Justice, which protect the property of all Citizens equally." Id. at 421.
59. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 19, at 376. Notably, Williamson and his
friends in North Carolina paid little attention to the hortatory phrasing of the Civil Jury Clause, which
declared that the civil jury "is one of the best securities of the rights of the people, and ought to remain
sacred and inviolable." N.C. Decl. of Rights of 1776, art. XIV (emphasis added). This provides yet
another useful reminder that "close-reading textualism is a poor guide to original meaning." William
Michael Treanor, Taking Text Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and the Case of
Amar's Bill of Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 487, 518 (2007). Scholars, however, routinely point to the
hortatory phrasing of bills of rights in the Founding Era as evidence of their non-enforceability. See
Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights "Retained" by the
People, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 267, 303 n.101 (1992) (collecting sources).
60. See Treanor, supra note 46, at 480 ("[T]he court does not suggest that only statutes in that
category [of straightforward application of constitutional text] can be properly found unconstitu-
tional.").
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claim that "ex post facto laws were void of themselves."6 ' After the Conven-
tion, in fact, Williamson embraced the standard Federalist position that enumera-
tion was unnecessary. It was "perfectly understood," he insisted, "that under the
Government of the Assemblies of the States, and under the Government of the
Congress, every right is reserved to the individual, which he has not expressly
delegated to this, or that Legislature," thus obviating any need for "a second
Declaration of Rights." 6 2 To be sure, Williamson may have changed his mind,
or he might have been arguing disingenuously to advance the ratification cause.
But perhaps his earlier comments in Philadelphia were less about the legal
necessity of enumeration and more about judicial politics.
North Carolina's experience, after all, revealed that enumeration served a
useful purpose during litigation, even if it was not legally essential. As occurred
in other states, the exercise of judicial review in North Carolina was highly
controversial, leading both to impeachment proceedings against the presiding
judges and to a grand jury presentment of Bayard's lawyer, William Richardson
Davie, for having asserted the existence of such a controversial power.63 And in
this precarious environment, judges with textual support for upholding rights
were naturally more inclined to disregard legislation and less likely to suffer
backlash. Enumerating rights, one might say, would give judges something to
"take hold of."
Evidence shows that Williamson was attentive to these political challenges.
Only a few months after the Philadelphia Convention adjourned, he defended
the creation of federal courts because it was "at least possible that some State
may be found in this Union, disposed to break the Constitution," and "the
Courts of the offending States would probably decide according to its own
laws."6 4 Doing so, of course, would clearly violate the Supremacy Clause. But
Williamson was focused on practical barriers to judicial review. Even when
their legal obligations were clear, he still feared that judges would fail to apply
governing law.
Nor was Williamson alone in these concerns. The judiciary had a "natural
feebleness," Alexander Hamilton explained in Federalist No. 78, and was "in
continual jeopardy of being overpowered, awed or influenced by [the] coordi-
61. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 19, at 376.
62. Hugh Williamson, Speech at Edenton, N.C., in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION 201, 202 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1986).
63. Hamburger rightly notes that some supporters of impeachment criticized the judges for initially
failing to hold the statute unconstitutional. See HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 455. On Davie's
impeachment, see PA. PACKET, July 1, 1786, at 2 ("Col. Davie, particularly, sustained those arguments,
with so much warmth and energy, that the grand jury, considering his free investigation of the
Assembly's conduct as a criminal step, in its nature injurious to, destructive of, and against the peace
and dignity of the State, presented him on the 27th ult. But the judges, either more indulgent, or better
acquainted with the rights of a lawyer defending his client, or an unprejudiced citizen the liberty of his
country, discharged him."). On backlash elsewhere, see KRAMER, supra note 21, at 64-69.
64. Williamson, supra note 62, at 204.
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nate branches."6 5 Promoting judicial independence was thus essential. 6 Even
when politicians lacked widespread public support, pushing back against the
political branches would be challenging. "But it is easy to see," Hamilton
continued, "that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the
judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the [C]onstitution, where
legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the
community."6
But the structural protection of judicial life tenure was not enough. The
Framers also expressly declared the judicial duty to follow the Constitution
against countervailing state law, even though they generally accepted judicial
review as an inherent facet of judging.6 " First, they provided in the Supremacy
Clause that the Constitution would become "the supreme Law of the Land." 6 9
As a choice-of-law provision, that Clause required state and federal judges to
apply the Constitution against contravening state law. Supreme law, after all,
necessarily supersedes inferior law. Yet the Framers said more. Not only was the
Constitution "the supreme Law of the Land," but also "the Judges in every State
[were] bound thereby." 7 0
Almost without question, that provision was legally redundant.71 The Judges
Clause was "but an expression of the necessary meaning of the former clause,"
Joseph Story aptly remarked in his famous Commentaries on the Constitution of
the United States.72 But the Clause was still tremendously important. "The very
circumstance, that any objection was made [to judicial review]," Story ex-
plained, "demonstrated the utility, nay the necessity of the clause, since it
removed every pretence, under which ingenuity could, by its miserable subter-
",73fuges, escape from the controlling power of the constitution. Story was
exactly right.
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton).
66. Id. at 526-27.
67. Id. at 528.
68. See HAMBURGER, supra note 20, at 327-57, 404-61.
69. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
70. Id.
71. See Campbell, supra note 4, at 1163-64. Some legal observers have asserted that the Judges
Clause grants federal power to commandeer state judges, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 907 (1997), but that interpretation reads the Clause as responding to a nonexistent problem. To the
extent that one cares, the evidence of Framers' intent on this issue is indisputable. Prior to being shorted
by the Committee of Style, the Clause stated that "the Judges in the several States shall be bound
thereby in their Decisions, any Thing in the Constitutions or laws of the several States to the Contrary
notwithstanding." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 19, at 169 (emphasis added).
Constitutional surplusage, we must recall, was nothing unusual. See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W.
McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1721 (2012).
72. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 697 (Boston, Hilliard,
Gray, & Co. 1833).
73. Id.
74. See KRAMER, supra note 21, at 75 ("[The Judges Clause] answered the leading objection to
judicial review, which was that judges had not been authorized by the people to make such decisions.");
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The Constitution itself, in other words, demonstrated the Framers' belief that
enumeration was important for facilitating judicial review, even when it was
legally unnecessary.75 In this instance, the Judges Clause provided state judges
with something to "take hold of' in their assertion of judicial authority, even
though that legal duty was already implicit in the Supremacy Clause. Might
Madison have defended the enumeration of rights using the same rationale?
III. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
The omission of a bill of rights provided a rallying cry for opponents of
ratification, whom Federalists pejoratively labeled as "Anti-Federalists."7 George
Mason, for instance, mentioned the absence of rights at the top of his widely
circulated criticisms of the proposed Constitution. "There is no Declaration of
Rights," Mason lamented, "and the Laws of the general Government being
paramount to the Laws & Constitutions of the several States, the Declarations of
Rights in the separate States are no Security. Nor are the People secured even in
the Enjoyment of the Benefits of the common-Law." 7 7 Opponents of ratification
echoed these complaints throughout the ensuing months, eventually obtaining
promises from Federalists that they would amend the Constitution soon after the
new government began its operations.
Once the First Congress convened, however, Federalists showed little interest
in passing amendments. Madison pushed more vigorously. But he, too, revealed
a lingering ambivalence about enumeration. Creating a bill of rights would have
a "salutary tendency," Madison cautiously explained in his introductory speech,
and might "tend to prevent the exercise of undue power."7" For instance,
enumerating rights might "establish the public opinion in their favor" and "be
one mean to controul the majority from those acts to which they might be
otherwise inclined." 7 9 This discussion was all about the political and educa-
tive benefits of enumeration, not its legal consequences.
Madison then shifted toward a more legalistic argument, but he carefully
maintained an equivocal tone. The Necessary and Proper Clause, he explained,
RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 175 ("[T]he supremacy clause marked an attempt to incorporate a principle of
judicial review into all the state governments by the unilateral fiat of the Constitution.").
75. Notably, the Judges Clause involved an issue of great concern to the Framers-namely, state
adherence to the supremacy of federal law. When it came to a suggestion late in the convention to pass
a bill of rights with regard to federal power, however, the Framers soundly rejected the proposal. See
Bowling, supra note 8, at 225.
76. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 38, at 731 (remarks of Rep. Elbridge Gerry) ("Those
who were called anti-federalists at that time, complained that they had injustice done them by the title,
because they were in favor of a Federal Government, and the others were in favor of a national one.").
See generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787-1788 (2010);
SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA,
1788-1828 (1999).
77. Mason, supra note 47, at 43.
78. Madison, supra note 1, at 196, 203-04.
79. Id. at 204-05.
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gave Congress "certain discretionary powers with respect to the means" for
exercising enumerated powers, and this authority "may admit of abuse to a
certain extent."o "[A]n instance which ... proves that this might be the case,"
Madison commented, was the power to collect revenue, which Congress might
invoke to authorize general warrants."' "If there was reason for restraining the
state governments from exercising this power," he noted, still speaking condition-
ally, "there is like reason for restraining the federal government."8 2 His equivo-
cation was telling.
Madison then explicitly "admit[ted] the force" of the standard Federalist
position that "a bill of rights is not necessary." 8 3 Yet again, however, he returned
to the idea that enumeration would have, "to a certain degree, a salutary effect
against the abuse of power." 8 4 "If they are incorporated into the constitution,"
he remarked,
independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against
every assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be
naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for
in the constitution by the declaration of rights.8 5
"Besides this security," Madison then asserted, there was "a great probability"
that enumerated rights "would be inforced" by state legislatures who were "able
to resist with more effect every assumption of power than any other power on
earth can do." 6
According to the conventional view, Madison was explicitly endorsing the
judicial enforceability of all enumerated rights while implicitly denying the
constitutional status of all unenumerated rights. 7 "Madison's point," Laurence
Claus asserts, "was that enumeration makes rights judicially enforceable .... That
argument would not have been available to him had he actually contemplated,
or thought his audience contemplated, that courts would proclaim and enforce
federal constitutional rights anyway."88 Scholars also often tie Madison's congres-
sional speech to Thomas Jefferson's earlier comment that one reason for
declaring rights was "the legal check which it puts into the hands of the
80. Id. at 205 (emphasis added).
81. Id. (emphasis added).
82. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 206-07.
86. Id. at 207.
87. See supra note 3 (collecting sources). Among these authors, Michael McConnell asserts that
judges should nonetheless respect retained natural rights by equitably interpreting statutes to avoid
conflicts with those rights. See McConnell, supra note 3, at 22-23.
88. Claus, supra note 3, at 609.
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judiciary," 89 suggesting a legal authority that would not otherwise exist.
Even scholars who focus on Madison's political and educative rationales for
declaring rights do not dispute the legal character of his particular comment
about judicial review. Jack Rakove, for instance, emphasizes the depth of
Madison's skepticism about the judicial enforcement of rights. "Madison," he
observes, "did not expect the adoption of amendments to free judges to act
vigorously in defense of rights." 90 But Rakove never disclaims the ostensibly
positivist implications of Madison's statement. 91 A few other scholars have
suggested that Madison was making a practical argument,9 2 but these treatments
are cursory and still often suggest that Madison was making a point about
judicial duty.9 3
89. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 659, 659 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958). For the development of Madison's ideas, see Jack N.
Rakove, Judicial Power in the Constitutional Theory of James Madison, 43 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1513,
1531-32 (2002).
90. RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 335; see also Rakove, supra note 88, at 1532 ("[T]he idea that Madison
viewed [judicial enforcement of rights] with much optimism seems unlikely."); cf Ralph L. Ketcham,
James Madison and Judicial Review, 8 SYRACUSE L. REv. 158 (1957) (arguing that Madison vacillated
considerably about the propriety and scope of judicial review).
91. Rakove treats Madison's comment about judges as a minor point that should not distract from
Madison's general thesis about the practical benefits of enumeration. See RAKOVE, supra note 2, at 335.
This Essay fully agrees with Rakove's depiction of Madison's general thesis, but it offers different
interpretations of his comment about judging and, in turn, of the relationship between that comment and
his broader thesis. Whereas Rakove treats the minor point as a positivist throwaway line that "came
from Jefferson," id., this Essay argues that Madison subtly transformed the argument to avoid any
positivist implication and, in the same fell swoop, to reinforce his broader thesis about the salutary
effects of enumeration. But while Rakove has not described Madison's June 8 speech in this way, my
thesis aligns with Rakove's reading of other evidence relating to Madison's views about judicial review.
See Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031,
1049 (1997) ("Madison's analysis of the limits of judicial power was essentially a political one, and it
followed directly from the critique of the inherent factiousness and parochialism of state politics that
drove his constitutional theory."); id. at 1057 ("Madison ... obviously believed that the political
weakness of the courts would impair their capacity to do justice when they later acted in a properly
judicial capacity.").
92. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1, 26
(2006) ("Madison's prescient statement about the practical importance of enumerating rights says
nothing about how unenumerated rights ought to be treated, much less that they are to be judicially
unenforceable.").
93. See, e.g., Ryan Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REv.
498, 515 (2011) ("Although this passage does not necessarily support the proposition that rights omitted
from the enumeration were expected to be legally unenforceable, it does suggest the possibility that
Madison ... recognized that enumerating rights might place those rights on a different legal footing
than unenumerated rights by providing judges with a textual foundation for extending protection to
such rights."). Along these lines, Mark Graber cites Madison's statement for the idea that "enumeration
facilitated judicial protection for the specified rights," Mark A. Graber, Enumeration and Other
Constitutional Strategies for Protecting Rights: The View from 1787/1791, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. LAw 357,
393 (2007) (emphasis added), but Graber also refers to Madison's speech in a more legalistic way. See
id. at 361 ("[T]he conclusion might follow that the Constitution protected only those rights enumerated
in the text, rights best protected by the federal judiciary."); id. at 379 ("Enumerated rights would enable
the federal judiciary to protect the people's liberties."); see also DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON
POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 197-98, 208,
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Departing from these earlier studies, this Essay argues that Madison was
asserting neither the sufficiency nor the necessity of enumeration for the judicial
enforcement of rights against contrary legislation. These arguments are devel-
oped in turn.
A. The Sufficiency of Enumeration
Madison probably joined the First Congress without a committed position
about the legal significance of enumeration. Just the previous year, in fact, he
had revealed a deep ambivalence about judicial review. "Courts are generally
the last in making their decision," he remarked privately to a colleague, so "it
results to them, by refusing or not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it with its
final character. This makes the Judiciary Dept paramount in fact to the Legisla-
ture, which was never intended, and can never be proper." 94 And just a week
after introducing the Bill of Rights, Madison gave a speech in which he clearly
denied the supremacy of judges in fixing constitutional meaning. Instead, he
"suppose[d]," constitutional decisions "may be made with the most advantage
by the legislature itself," at least when acting in good faith. 95 And, as we have
seen, his primary arguments for enumerating rights had nothing to do with
courts or judging.9 6 Madison thus was extraordinarily unlikely to champion
highly controversial claims of judicial power.
Obviously, though, Madison accepted some judicial enforcement of enumer-
ated rights against contrary legislation. He was, after all, talking about "tribu-
nals of justice" protecting against "encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated
for in the constitution." 97 And, as we have seen, the Founders widely accepted
the judicial enforceability of fundamental positive rights. 98 But perhaps, with a
Federalist audience that largely accepted judicial enforcement of customary
fundamental positive rights,99 Madison was focusing on the effects of enumera-
tion on judicial psychology and judicial politics, not judicial duty.
Indeed, a careful examination of the newspaper report of Madison's June 8
speech supports this conclusion. He began, after all, by observing that enumera-
tion, while not necessary, would nonetheless have "a salutary effect." 00 And
each of Madison's subsequent statements about judicial power fit with this
theme. His assertions that courts would "consider themselves in a peculiar
210-11 (2009) (framing Madison's comments on enumeration of rights as functional but then insisting
on giving enumerated rights legal effect).
94. James Madison, Observations on the "Draught of a Constitution for Virginia," in 11 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON, supra note 6, at 285, 293.
95. James Madison, Removal Power of the President (June 17, 1789), in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON, supra note 1, at 232, 239.
96. See supra note 2.
97. Madison, supra note 1, at 207.
98. See supra Part I.A.
99. See KRAMER, supra note 21, at 97.
100. Madison, supra note 1, at 206.
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manner the guardians" of enumerated rights and "be naturally led to resist every
encroachment" explicitly speak to judicial psychology, not legal obligation.o
Enumeration, in short, could bolster the willingness of judges to risk a confronta-
tion with politicians. 10 2 Judges might still encounter political resistance, of
course, but at least they would know that they could hold up the constitutional
text-the people's own instructions-as their warrant.
Madison's claim (or, perhaps, reporter Thomas Lloyd's embellishment) that
courts would form "an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of
power in the legislative or executive" is more opaque but probably addressed
judicial politics. Not only would judges "consider themselves" a guardian of
rights; their guardianship of those rights would more likely be "impenetrable."
In any event, this passage deserves less attention. The Founders often spoke in a
similar grandiose way about juries and press freedom, but this eighteenth-
century rhetoric should not be understood literally. (Madison's subsequent
praise of state legislatures as "able to resist with more effect every assumption
of power than any other power on earth can do" reflects the same rhetorical
flair.)
In sum, Madison was not making an argument about legal duties. Still, he
may have implicitly taken for granted that enumerating positive rights was
sufficient for their judicial enforcement. That idea, after all, was widely ac-
cepted by his Federalist audience. 103 Thus, if Madison assumed judicial enforce-
101. Id. at 207 (emphases added).
102. For concerns about judicial refusals to follow binding law, see James Madison, Vices of the
Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON: CONGRESSIONAL
SERIES 345, 352 (Robert A. Rutland & William M. E. Rachal eds., 1975) ("[T]he acts of Congs.... are
tho' nominally authoritative, in fact recommendatory only.... Whenever a law of a State happens to be
repugnant to an act of Congress .. . [and] the question must be decided by the Tribunals of the State,
they will be most likely to lean on the side of the State."); Letter from James Madison to Edmund
Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787), in PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra at 368, 370 ("If the judges in the last
resort depend on the States [and] are bound by their oaths to them and not to the Union, the intention of
the law and the interests of the nation may be defeated by the obsequiousness of the Tribunals to the
policy or prejudices of the States."); see also Rakove, Origins of Judicial Review, supra note 91, at
1040, 1048 ("Perhaps the crucial matter is not merely for courts to review legislation, but to summon
the intestinal fortitude to void a constitutionally doubtful act .... What made the institution of judicial
review problematic in their original assessments was not its constitutional legitimacy, but rather doubts
about its capacity to withstand the buffeting of either state- or national-oriented political forces."). Just
a week after his bill of rights speech, Madison may have expressed doubts "that judges would muster
the fortitude to intervene in a highly charged [constitutional] dispute" that turned on unenumerated
constitutional principles. Rakove, supra note 89, at 1532. It is worth noting, however, that Madison's
concern over whether "they" would "decide so calmly as at this time" was perhaps a reference to
Senators, not to judges. See James Madison, Removal Power of the President (June 18, 1789), in 12
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 1, at 244, 244-45 ("If we leave the constitution to take this
course, it can never be expounded until the president shall think it expedient to exercise the right of
removal, if he supposes he has it; then the senate may be induced to set up their pretensions: And will
they decide so calmly as at this time, when no important officer in any of the great departments is
appointed to influence their judgments? The imagination of no member here, or of the senate, or of the
president himself, is heated or disturbed by faction: If ever a proper moment for decision should offer, it
must be one like the present.").
103. See supra Part I.B. and Part II.
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ment of enumerated positive rights, like the guarantee of a jury trial, that
assumption was uncontroversial.
Nonetheless, Madison was hardly suggesting that every enumerated right
would be judicially enforceable against contrary legislation. Consider, for in-
stance, the first proposal in Madison's list of amendments:
That . . . all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from
the people.
That government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of
the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right
of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.
That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to
reform or change their government, whenever it be found adverse or inad-
equate to the purposes of its institution. 104
Madison planned for these clauses to appear in the preamble. 105 They "may be
called," he explained, "a bill of rights."1 0 6
Madison's first proposal clearly acknowledged the inalienable natural rights
of life, liberty, and property, as well as the "right of revolution" asserted by the
rebelling American colonists. 1 0 7 Yet nobody at the Founding claimed that these
rights were judicially enforceable, at least not in the conventional sense. Natural
rights, as we have seen, were judicially enforceable only insofar as judges
voided or equitably construed statutes in the face of manifest legislative disre-
gard for the public interest. And even that contested power was derived from
general constitutional principles, not the enumeration of rights.
Consider also the First Amendment right of free exercise. This provision
recognized a firm limit to federal power-namely, the unconstitutionality of
religious persecution.108 But past this core protection, the Founders did not
suggest that judges had primary authority to determine the proper bounds of
natural liberty when governmental powers collided with religious concerns in
104. Madison, supra note 1, at 200.
105. Id. Two months later, Madison defended the placement of his natural-rights proposal "in the
Constitution ... in this place [i.e., the preamble]," 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 38, at 719 (remarks
of James Madison) (emphasis added), which would seem to suggest that these proposed rights would be
"incorporated into the constitution." Madison, supra note 1, at 206-07 (emphasis added). Others took a
different view but without particular reference to judicial review. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note
38, at 718 (remarks of Thomas Tudor Tucker) (a preamble is "no part of the Constitution"); id. (remarks
of Rep. John Page) (same).
106. Madison, supra note 1, at 203.
107. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment outside Article
V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457, 476 (1994) (noting the historical connection between popular sovereignty
and the right of revolution).
108. See Philip Hamburger, More is Less, 90 VA. L. REv. 835, 838-57 (2004).
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other ways. 109 At the state level, for instance, religious freedom was mentioned
in nearly every constitution or bill of rights, but judges consistently deferred to
legislative or customary judgments regarding the propriety of blasphemy laws
and the availability of exemptions when individuals had religious scruples.110
These conflicts still implicated natural rights, but it was not up to judges to
determine the degree to which natural liberty should be curtailed in the public
interest.
In this context, Madison's audience would not have understood his comments
as implying, much less singlehandedly accomplishing, a radical transformation
in the nature and scope of judicial authority. Rather, if Madison was suggesting
that enumeration was a sufficient condition for judicial enforcement, his position
undoubtedly was limited to positive rights, including longstanding positive-law
protections for natural liberty."' On that issue, his audience would have broadly
agreed.
109. Relying on Madison's June 8 speech, Michael McConnell concludes: "Once the people
empowered the courts to enforce the boundary between individual rights and the magistrate's power,
they entrusted the courts with a responsibility that prior to 1789 had been exercised only by the
legislature." Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1409, 1445 (1990). Along similar lines, David Bogen concludes that
"freedom of speech meant that restrictions on speech are impermissible unless necessary to accomplish
a legitimate function of government, and that the courts rather than the legislature should ultimately
determine that necessity." Bogen, supra note 3, at 458. But Madison, as this Essay argues, was not
making a sweeping endorsement of judicial power to determine the proper scope of natural liberty. Not
surprisingly, then, there is strikingly little evidence of judicially enforceable religious exemptions at the
Founding, see Wesley J. Campbell, Note, A New Approach to Nineteenth-Century Religious Exemption
Cases, 63 STAN. L. REv. 973, 987 (2011), just as there is strikingly little evidence of judicially
enforceable protection for expressive freedom outside the protection for well-intentioned statements of
one's thoughts, see generally Campbell, supra note 24. At the same time, however, Founding Era
evidence disproves a talismanic acceptance of neutral, generally applicable laws. See, e.g., Michael W.
McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience?: A Critique of
Justice Scalia's Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 819, 838
(1998) ("[W]hen the Continental Congress, for one example, stated that imposing military conscription
on 'people, who, from religious principles, cannot bear arms in any case' would be an act of 'violence
to their consciences,' this tells us something about the understood meaning of the rights of con-
science . . . ."); see also Wesley J. Campbell, Religious Neutrality in the Early Republic, 24 REGENT
U. L. REv. 311, 316 (2012) ("The Free Exercise Clause guaranteed a natural, unalienable right of
religious freedom-not a right to governmental neutrality."). In my view, Founding Era evidence
militates against robust judicial enforcement of religious exemptions but, at the same time, reinforces
that incidental restrictions of religious practice or religious conscience implicated the natural right of
religious freedom, just as every law restricting human actions implicated the natural right of liberty.
See, e.g., St. George Tucker, On the State of Slavery in Virginia (1796), in VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGs 402, 407 (1999) ("[W]henever [natural] liberty is, by the
laws of the state, further restrained than is necessary and expedient for the general advantage, a state of
civil slavery commences immediately . . . ."). For articles with pertinent evidence, see, e.g., Philip
Hamburger, Religious Freedom in Philadelphia, 54 EMORY L.J. 1603 (2005); Vincent Phillip Mufloz,
The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1083 (2008).
110. See Campbell, New Approach, supra note 109, at 989-98 (discussing religious-exemption cases
from the early 1800s).
111. See generally Campbell, supra note 24 (discussing the relationship between natural rights and
positive rights).
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B. The Necessity of Enumeration
But what about the necessity of enumeration for judicial enforcement? Even
if enumeration was sometimes but not always sufficient to trigger judicial
enforcement of rights against contrary legislation, was Madison arguing that
judicial enforceability was only possible when a right was specifically included
in the Constitution?
Madison's drafting and defense of the Bill of Rights demonstrates his desire
to remain neutral on this issue. 1 12 First, as mentioned earlier, Madison explicitly
"admit[ted] the force" of the conventional Federalist view that "a bill of rights is
not necessary," and he framed his comments about judging only in terms of the
"salutary effect" that enumeration might have "to a certain degree." 1 3 This was
hardly language that suggested legal necessity. And in the three clauses about
judicial enforcement, Madison never expressly denied that unenumerated rights
were judicially enforceable.1 1 4 To be sure, he never took the opposite position
either-that some unenumerated rights were already enforceable. But that is
exactly my point: Madison was not taking a public position on this contested
issue.
The context of Madison's speech reinforces this conclusion. Madison was
trying to convince his Federalist colleagues, most of whom viewed the enumera-
tion of rights as unnecessary, that they should write them down anyway. Viewed
from this standpoint, it is highly unlikely that he was arguing from the opposite
premise-that enumeration was essential. If that is what he meant, the argument
was a loser.
Madison's desire not to take a position on the necessity of enumeration is
further reflected in his eleventh proposal:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution, made in favor of
particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the just importance
of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by
the Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted
merely for greater caution.1 15
112. Madison's personal view on the necessity of enumeration is unknown. Given his cautious
attitude toward judicial review, one can imagine him privately supporting the necessity of enumeration.
See supra notes 90, 94, and 95 and accompanying text; see also 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION,
supra note 19, at 440 ("Is not that already done by the prohibition of ex post facto laws, which will
oblige the Judges to declare such interferences null & void."); cf supra note 89 (mentioning Madison's
correspondence with Jefferson). On the other hand, Madison belonged to an elite political class that,
steeped in the tradition of customary constitutionalism, widely rejected the notion that enumeration was
essential to the judicial enforcement of rights. See supra Part I.B. and Part II.
113. Madison, supra note 1, at 206. At another point, he described his list of rights "either as actual
limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution," carefully avoiding offending
either side. Id. at 202.
114. Accord Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20
(1988).
115. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 38, at 435.
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This provision, framed as a rule of construction, answered leading objections to
the Constitution's omission of rights. "It has been objected ... against a bill of
rights," Madison explained, "that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the
grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that
enumeration," rendering them "insecure." 1 6 For instance, by enumerating only
a criminal jury right, Federal Farmer had warned, the Framers had "strongly
implied" that the right to a civil jury would not "be regarded in the federal
administration as fundamental." 1 7
Madison's proposed constructive rule (which, after revisions, became the
Ninth Amendment) responded to this concern by guaranteeing that non-
enumeration was not a basis for denying the "just importance" of unenumerated
rights. This language carefully avoided taking a position on the potential
"fundamental" status of unenumerated rights. Did Madison agree, for instance,
with Federal Farmer's suggestion during the ratification debates that it was
"doubtful" whether Americans could claim fundamental positive rights "under
immemorial usage"? Neither Madison's proposed constructive rule nor his
explanatory speech supply an answer. Rather, all that the Ninth Amendment
provides is that unenumerated rights remain in whatever position they were in
prior to enumeration.18
CONCLUSION
Coming from a culture where judicial power is taken for granted, we have a
tendency to forget that "the Founders often spoke in terms of practical authority
rather than constitutional authority."ll 9 Maybe, in our lawyerly way, we have
missed Madison's effort to facilitate rights enforcement by buttressing a legal
authority that many thought already existed. Rather than supporting the neces-
sity or sufficiency of enumeration for the judicial enforcement of rights, Madi-
son was making a more practical point. The judiciary, as Hamilton famously
remarked, had "neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment." 1 2 0 The least that
116. Id. at 439.
117. Federal Farmer No. 16, supra note 40, at 1056. Notably, these arguments focused on fundamen-
tal positive rights. Id. at 1057-58; Brutus No. 2 (1787), reprinted in 19 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 154, 156-59 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2003); Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 440
(Julian P Boyd ed., 1955). A notable exception was the freedom of conscience, which was a natural
right, but even that right had enjoyed positive-law protection in some form ever since the Toleration
Act.
118. Accord KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 82 (2009) ("In sum: The text
of the Ninth Amendment prevents interpretations of enumerated rights that negatively affect the
unenumerated retained rights of the people. . . . [T]he fact of enumeration [cannot be] relied upon to
suggest the necessity or superiority of enumeration.").
119. See Campbell, supra note 4, at 1178 n.301 (making this point in the context of statements about
governmental power more generally).
120. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 16, at 523 (Alexander Hamilton).
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the First Congress could do was provide judges with a textual basis for
exercising their "awful" duty.1 2 1
121. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (opinion of Iredell, J.) ("[A]s the authority to
declare [a statute] void is of a delicate and awful nature, the Court will never resort to that authority, but
in a clear and urgent case."); Edmund Pendleton, Pendleton's Account of "The Case of the Prisoners,"
in 2 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, 1734-1803, at 417 (David John Mays ed., 1967)
("But how far this Court in which it has been properly said the Judiciary Powers of the State
are concentrated, can go in declaring an Act of the Legislature void, because it is repugnant to the
Constitution, without exercising the Power of Legislation, from which they are restrained by the same
Constitution? is a deep, important, and, I will add, an awful question."); see KRAMER, supra note 21, at
64 ("Early proponents of judicial review were quite self-conscious in recognizing the awful nature of
what they were doing: 'awful' in the eighteenth century sense of something full of awe.").
